UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-12-2008

State v. Kofoed Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34589

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kofoed Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34589" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1683.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1683

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID

COPY

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 34589

)
)

vs.

,

FILED~ OPY

)

)

KAY JAMES KOFOED,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

.

_____________ )
----------

1/);11

Suprem'e~~ourt -Court of App1;a/s
\___
Entered on ATS by: _ _ · · L
------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF PAYETTE

HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

DANIEL W. BOWER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

]

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................... 1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 3
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4
Kofoed Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's
Conclusion That Law Enforcement's Hurried Entry Was
Constitutionally Justified ............................................................................. 4
A.

lntroduction ...................................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5

C.

Police Had Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That
Evidence Was Being Destroyed And, Therefore, Had
Justification For Their Early Entrance .............................................. 5
1.

The Movement Away From The Door Immediately
After Law Enforcement Knocked Justified Police Entry ........ 6

2.

Suppression Is Not The Proper Remedy Under
The Idaho Or United States Constitution .............................. 9

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) ................................................. 10, 11
Jones

v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2005) ................................................ 6

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) .................................................................. 9
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ................................................................... 11
McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1964) ..................................... 7
Richards

v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) ..................................................... 6

State v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649,962 P.2d 1033 (1998) ........................... 12
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986) ................................................. 13
State v. Lusby, --- P.3d ---, ---- 2008 WL 2278074
(Idaho App., June 5, 2008) .......................................................................... 10
State

v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628, 130 P.3d 1166 (Ct. App. 2006) .............. 6, 9 13

State

v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978) ........................................ 13

State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126,982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999) .................... 12
State

v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 858 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1993) ......................... 5

State

v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501 (1992) .................................. 13

State

v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2005) ................. 10

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) ...................................................... 6
United States v. Barrett, 725 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1989) ...................................... 8
United States

v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1986) .................................. 7

Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) ................. 11
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) .......................................................... 6

ii

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Idaho Const. art. I,§ 17 .......................................................................... 9, 12, 13

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kay James Kofoed appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Kofoed specifically challenges
the denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
While executing a search warrant at Kofoed's residence/workshop in
Fruitland, police discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, two handguns, and
various items of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6-7, 88.) The primary basis for the
search warrant was reports of a strong chemical smell, consistent with that which
is present during the manufacture of methamphetamine, originating from
Kofoed's residence/workshop. (R., p.101) The first report, by a neighbor, was
made nine days before the execution of the warrant. (R., p.40.) The second
report, made by the same neighbor and confirmed by police, was made three
days before the execution of the warrant. (R., p.41.) Because of the timing of
the warrant, Jaw enforcement was of the opinion that although the "operational
laboratory w[ould] not be discovered" lab items, precursors to production,
paraphernalia, and the finished product -- methamphetamine -- would be found.
(R., p.41.)
The warrant was executed by the Fruitland Police Department and the
Payette County Sheriff's Office.

(Tr., p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.2.)

The lead law

enforcement officer announced the law enforcement presence and that they
possessed a warrant. (Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22.) Following that announcement, there
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was a loud noise, like something metal was dropped or kicked, followed by
noticeable scuffling going away from the door.

(Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.27, L.2.)

Because of what they heard, the officers immediately entered the premises to
stop what they believed would be the destruction of evidence. (Tr., p.26, Ls.211.)
Pursuant to the items discovered in the search and the testimony of
individuals located inside the residence/workshop, the state charged Kofoed with
one count of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.6-7.) Following a
preliminary hearing, the court ordered Kofoed bound over to the district court.
(R., p.55.) Kofoed moved to suppress, challenging the validity and terms of the
search warrant and asserting that police did not comply with the knock-andannounce requirement. (R., pp. 60-81.) After taking evidence at a hearing, the
court rejected Kofoed's claims. (R., pp. 100-08.) In a written opinion, the district
court concluded that the warrant was valid and, under the facts of the case, there
were exigent circumstances that justified the officers' hurried entry into Kofoed's
residence.

(R., pp. 100-08.)

Subsequent to the court's ruling, Kofoed entered into a plea agreement.
(R., p.114-18.) Kofoed reserved, however, his right to appeal the district court's
denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., p.114-18.)

reservation, Kofoed filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 141-43.)
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Consistent with that

ISSUES
Kofoed states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kofoed's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Kofoed failed to show error in the district court's conclusion
that the police acted reasonably in entering Kofoed's residence after they
knocked and announced and subsequently heard indications of noncompliance
suggesting destruction of evidence?
2.
Does Hudson v. Michigan require this Court to readdress the
application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce rule?
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ARGUMENT
Kofoed Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That Law
Enforcement's Hurried Entry Was Constitutionally Justified
A.

Introduction
While executing a search warrant on a building in which the police had

probable cause to believe methamphetamine was present, police knocked and
announced their presence.

After hearing a load noise, "like something either

being kicked or dropped" followed by footsteps and scuffling going away from the
door, police entered the residence. (Tr., p. 24, L.13 - p.26, L.15.) The district
court determined, in light of these facts, that exigent circumstances excused
compliance

with

requirements.

the
(R.,

and

constitutional
pp.105-06.)

statutory

"knock-and-announce"

Kofoed claims there was no exigent

circumstance that justified police entry. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Specifically,
he argues that police did not act reasonably because "it is highly unlikely that
movement away from the door would create the exigency that the evidence
would be destroyed" because "the officers were unsure of the quantities of drugs
they might" find in the residence. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Application of the law
to the circumstances present here shows that the officers had justification for
their hurried entry -- the movement going away from the door indicated
noncompliance with law enforcement's statement of presence and authority and
provided reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence was being or about to be
destroyed.

Furthermore, even if the hurried entry was unjustified, the proper

remedy was not suppression because Kofoed cannot show that "but for" the early
entry, the evidence he sought to suppress would not have been discovered.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether police have complied with "knock-and-announce" requirements is

a mixed issue of fact and law in which the court defers to the factual findings of
the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews application
of the law to the facts found. State

v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 280, 858 P:2d 814,

819 (Ct. App. 1993) (addressing Idaho's "knock-and-announce" statute).

C.

Police Had Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That Evidence Was Being
Destroyed And, Therefore, Had Justification For Their Early Entrance
Kofoed claims there was no exigent circumstance that justified law

enforcement's hurried entry after they knocked and announced their presence.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) As a result, Kofoed asserts his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated and that the evidence should have been suppressed
pursuant to the exclusionary rule.
lack merit.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Kofoed's claims

Law enforcement needed no exigent circumstance to justify the

hurried entry because the movement inside the premises indicated that the
occupants would not comply with law enforcement's lawful demands. Further,
law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence would be
destroyed and, as a result, had a basis for entering the premises without waiting
for compliance to their knock and announce. Additionally, even if there was a
violation of the knock-and-announce rule, exclusion of the items found in the
search is not the proper remedy under either the United States or Idaho
constitutions.
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1.

The Movement Away From The Door Immediately After Law
Enforcement Knocked Justified Police Entry

Kofoed claims the movement away from the door was insufficient to create
an exigent circumstance that justified the hurried entry.

Prior to executing a

search warrant, law enforcement must knock on the door, announce their identity
and authority, and wait a reasonable time for the occupants to respond before
entering forcibly. State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628,630, 130 P.3d 1166 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934
(1995)).

The rule is not absolute and courts have recognized, under some

circumstances, an unannounced entry is permissible.

lli

Specific exigencies

include threats to officer safety or a likelihood that evidence might be destroyed.

lli

Even if exigent circumstances are initially absent, reasonable suspicion of an

exigency may develop when the police arrive to execute a search warrant, and
the police may then proceed with immediate forced entry.

lli (citing

Banks, 540

U.S. at 37). "The police may also conduct a forced entry after knocking and
announcing if exigent circumstances arise prior to an occupant answering the
door."

lli (citing

Banks, 540 U.S. at 38).

As a threshold matter, the police complied by the knock-and-announce
rule by entering the premises only after they heard noises indicating
noncompliance. A primary purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to give the
occupants of a residence, subject to the execution of a warrant, the opportunity
to peaceably comply. Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 467 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This
knock-and-announce requirement serves to protect residents' ability to comply
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with the law by peaceably permitting officers to enter their dwelling .... "). Here,
the police officer articulated facts and rational inferences that justified entry a
short moment after the officers knocked and announced their presence. Under
the circumstances, their wait, although short, was reasonable because it was
long enough for the
noncompliance.

police to determine the occupant's

response --

The officer stated that they knocked on the door to the

premises, announced that they were with the sheriff's office, and that they had a
search warrant. (Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22.) Only then, after the occupants knew of the
police presence and the inevitability of the premise being searched, did they
respond by moving away from the door. (Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.27, L.2.) This shows
that the police not only complied with the knock-and-announce requirements but
also waited a reasonable amount of time. Thus, regardless of any applicable
exigency, the officers' hurried entry complied with the mandates of the rule.
The indication of non-compliance, coupled with the probable cause that
there was contraband present, created reasonable articulable suspicion that
evidence was being destroyed or about to be destroyed. Accordingly, early entry
was justified as an exigent circumstance. See, !Lll,_, United States v. Mitchell,
783 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860 (1986) (finding exigent
circumstance where police waited only three to five seconds after they knocked
and announced, and "heard sounds of people moving inside the house [that]
suggested the occupants were not moving towards the door"); McClure v. United
States, 332 F.2d 19, 21-22 (9th Cir. 1964) (early entry justified as exigent
circumstance after police heard footsteps going away from the door); United
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States v. Barrett, 725 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1989) (early entry of police justified as
exigent circumstance after law enforcement knocked and announced and heard
footsteps moving away from the door).
Kofoed argues, however, that because "the officers possessed information
that manufacturing was occurring in the residence, it is highly unlikely that
movement away from the door would create the exigency that the evidence
would be destroyed" and, therefore, that the officers were not excused from
"complying with the knock-and-announce rule." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
Kofoed's claim is misplaced.

The search warrant made clear that the

officers did not believe they would find "an operational laboratory" at the time
they executed the search warrant -- but rather, items like beakers, paraphernalia,
and methamphetamine. (R., p.41.) This was based on the fact that the cooking
odor had been detected three days earlier. (R., pp.39-40.) Indeed, the search
warrant itself specified that police were looking for "various quantities" of
methamphetamine as opposed to a laboratory.

(R.,

p.35.)

Further,

paraphernalia and the final product itself, methamphetamine, is evidence of
criminal activity that can potentially be destroyed or altered in a short period of
time. Consequently, Kofoed's claim that police knowledge of prior manufacturing
negates the reasonable suspicion that evidence was being destroyed is without
merit.
Additionally, Kofoed's argument implies that the exigency is not applicable
where some but not all of the evidence can be destroyed. This argument is
logically flawed and ignores a foundational principle of the exigency rule -- that
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"[s]uspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence." Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963). There is no indication that this statement is
qualified -- that suspects are entitled to destroy evidence up to a certain point or
to the point of being prosecuted for the most serious crime that law enforcement
might be investigating.

Indeed, following Kofoed's reasoning, the potential for

being prosecuted for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substances
precludes any exigency that relates to evidence that would lead to a crime like
possession. This is not the test. See Ramos, 142 Idaho at 632, 130 P.3d at
1170 ("The type of evidence that provides reasonable suspicion of exigent
circumstances, allowing forced entry after the police arrive or after they knock
and announce, is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the
totality of the circumstances.")
Accordingly, the movement away from the door, coupled with the totality of
circumstances, including the probable cause that there was methamphetamine
and paraphernalia present that could be destroyed, created an exigent
circumstances that justified entry.
2.

Suppression Is Not The Proper Remedy Under The Idaho Or
United States Constitution

Kofoed moved the district court to suppress based on his claim of "Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his
rights under the Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 17." (R., p.61.) On appeal,
Kofoed maintains that suppression is the proper remedy in this case.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.)
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It is well established that in order for the exclusionary rule to apply there
must be a causal connection between the police misconduct and the evidence
sought to be suppressed. In State v. Lusby, --- P.3d ---, ---- 2008 WL 2278074
(Idaho App., June 5, 2008), the court affirmed the district court's order
suppressing evidence found pursuant to a search incident to arrest because it
was not sufficiently connected to the illegal entry. The Court reasoned:
Because the exclusionary rule imposes a price upon society that
can enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary rule is
only applicable if there is a causal connection between the police
misconduct and the acquisition of the challenged evidence
).9.,. at *1. See also, State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.3d 536,540

(Ct. App. 2005) ("Suppression is required only if the evidence sought to be
suppressed would

not have come

to

light

but for the government's

unconstitutional conduct.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nowhere have Idaho courts identified an exception to this general rule.
Consistent with this standard articulated by Idaho Courts, the United
States Supreme Court has recently provided guidance on the requirement of a
direct causal connection between the police misconduct and the item sought to
be suppressed.

In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), a case that

involved a knock-and-announce violation, the Court held that the exclusionary
rule was dependent on both "but for" causation and attenuation of that causation.
).9.,. at 592. On the first requisite -- "but for" causation, the court made clear that

"but-for causality is ... a necessary ... condition for suppression." ).9.,. The court
reasoned that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not meet this "but
for" standard:

"In this case of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal
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manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Whether that

preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the
warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside
the house."

kl at 592 (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court also

clarified prior precedent that may have indicated a wider application of the
exclusionary rule, including Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Whitely v.
Warden. Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971 ).

Hudson, 547

U.S. at 591.
The Supreme Court also recognized that "cases excluding the fruits of
unlawful warrrantless searches. say nothing about the appropriateness of
exclusion to vindicate the interests protected by the knock-and-announce
requirement" and, consequently, that the causal connection is different.

See

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. The court reasoned:
Until a valid warrant has issued, citizens are entitled to shield "their
persons, houses, papers, and effects," from government scrutiny.
Exclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search
vindicates that entitlement. The interests protected by the knockand-announce requirement are quire different -- and do not include
the shielding of potential evidence from the government's eyes.

kl Thus, the Court not only recognized a difference between the manner of
entry and entitlement of entry but the court has also recognized the fact that
those differences protect different interests. Consequently, where a valid warrant
exists and permits entry there is no "but for" connection between the manner of
entry and the evidence ultimately located in the place the warrant permits to be
searched.
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No Idaho court since Hudson has directly discussed this "but for"
causation requirement -- particularly as it relates to violations of the knock-andannounce rule. Kofoed asserts, nevertheless, that Idaho's exclusionary rule has
been interpreted differently and that no "but for" causation need exist in the
knock-and-announce context.

Kofoed acknowledges Hudson, but claims that

Hudson is inconsequential and irrelevant to any state constitutional analysis
regarding the application of the exclusionary rule.

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

Kofoed makes this claim even though the language of Article 17 of the Idaho
constitution and the Fourth Amendment are virtually the same and where he has
provided no justification for interpreting Article 17 differently. As recognized by
this Court:
We are not required to follow United States Supreme Court
precedent in interpreting United States Supreme Court precedent in
interpreting Article I, § 17. However, our Supreme Court has
recently observed that: "There is merit in having the same rule of
law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or its counterpart -- Article
I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution -- is involved. Such consistency
makes sense to the police and the public."
State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126,130,982 P.2d 961,965 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing
and quoting State v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653, 962 P.2d 1033, 1037
(1998)).
Several neutral, nonexclusive criteria must be examined when an
argument is made for a divergence between federal and state constitutional law.
These criteria include: 1) the textual language of the state constitution; 2)
significant differences in the text of parallel provisions of the federal and state
constitutions; 3) state constitutional and common law history; 4) preexisting state
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law; 5) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; 6)
matters of particular state interest or local concern; 7) public attitudes; and 8)
state traditions. See, ~ . State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501
(1992) (Bistline, J., concurring); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-813 (Wash.
1986). Even assuming the court were to consider whether to differentiate
between the two constitutions, Kofoed has failed to demonstrate that the
application of any these criteria provides a valid basis for interpreting Article I, §
17 of the Idaho Constitution any differently than its federal counterpart, the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Kofoed's argument must fail.
Kofoed's sole reason for creating an exception are two cases decided
prior to Hudson -- State v. Ramos, and State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d
671 (1978). Although Rauch and Ramos mention state constitutional grounds,
they are not premised on those grounds. Notably present in those opinions is the
heavy reliance on United State's Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, in Ramos,
the Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged the issue had not been addressed by
the Supreme Court but predicted, incorrectly, what the Court would do in the
future.

142 Idaho at 634; 130 P.3d at 1172. Pursuant to this prediction, the

Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted the Idaho constitution the same way.

kl,_

Hudson rendered that prediction incorrect and, by so doing, undermined the very
basis of Kofoed's authority. Notably absent from either opinion is any discussion
of the factors Idaho courts must be examined when distinguishing between
federal and state constitutional law.
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In sum, regardless of the language found in Rauch or Ramos, this Court
should apply a standard consistent with the federal standard and the other Idaho
exclusionary rule cases. That standard would mandate suppression when the
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light "but for" law
enforcement's illegal conduct. Thus, here, where the evidence would have been
searched regardless of the claimed illegal entry, there is "no but" for causation
and, therefore, no basis for suppression.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kofoed's conviction.

DATED this 12th day of August 2008.

~.BO,r~
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of August 2008, served a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN CURTIS
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